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Corporatism -with its privileged access, restricted participation and centralized
structures - has a long history in Norwegian fisheries governance. Co-management –
understood as a decentralized, bottom-up and more inclusive form of fisheries
governance - has not been considered a relevant alternative.. Why does corporatism
still prevail in a context where stakeholder status in fisheries governance globally – both
in principle and practice - has been awarded environmental organizations, municipal
authorities and even consumer advocacy groups? Why then have alternatives to the
corporatist system of centralized consultation and state governance never been seriously
considered in Norway, in spite of the growing emphasis on fish as a public resource and
fisheries management as human intervention in geographically confined and complex
ecosystems? We suggest that this may have to do with the fundamental assumptions
behind Norwegian fisheries governance that since fish is a national resource, it must be
centrally managed. We argue that this is an assumption that may be contested.
Keywords: Fisheries governance; Corporatism; Co-management; Legitimacy; Marine
protected areas; Indigenous people; Regionalism; Norway
“It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more
doubtful of success (…), than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has
enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all
those who would profit by the new order…” (Machiavelli, The Prince and the
Discourses, 1950, p. 21).Introduction
The history of Norwegian fisheries governance – its institutions, procedures and partici-
pants – is basically one of private-public partnership where policy is the outcome of consul-
tations and negotiations, both formal and informal, between industry representatives and
government officials. In this case, Machiavelli’s “old order of things” is essentially a system
of centralized consultation with an element of power-sharing through corporatist arrange-
ments facilitating the participation (and influence) of a select group of stakeholders (cf.
Mikalsen and Jentoft 2003). There have been some attempts at initiating a “new order of
things” by including – inter alia - environmental groups and regional authorities at the
consultative stages of management policy-making. Yet, the essence of fisheries governance2014 Jentoft and Mikalsen.; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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central government, in close collaboration with industry, notably the Norwegian Fishermen’s
Association (NFA). This is basically a mode of governance where influence is traded for
legitimacy and support.
During the last decade, however, the “old order” has been challenged by proposals for a
regionalization (decentralization) of governance structures and management tasks. Initia-
tives for the establishment and (local) management of marine protected areas and proposals
by a government task force for regionally delimited fisheries zones, for example, challenge
the idea – reiterated like a mantra by the defenders of the old order – that fish, as a ‘first
principle” is a national resource and should therefore, as a logically derived, ‘second’
principle, be managed by central government. Neither the existence of local stocks (scientif-
ically verified), nor the argument that regional variations in stocks, fleet structure and
fishing practices warrant delegation, have carried much weight. In that sense centralized
consultation (read corporatism), has proved an enduring legacy in Norwegian fisheries
governance. Why then, have corporatism and the power and privileges it entails, survived in
the face of several attempts at fostering change and reform? What is the essence of these
attempts and why have they faltered? Apart from the perception of fish as a national
resource, why do key players cling to the idea that the fisheries – regardless of their charac-
ter and context –must be managed by central government?
We begin by outlining the main tenets of corporatism as a governance system, explaining
how it has evolved into a highly institutionalized partnership arrangement between the Min-
istry of Fisheries and the NFA. Then we discuss some of the main challenges to its
corporatist core, attempting to explain its resilience in the face of pressures for reform that
may well undermine its corporatist character. More specifically we present three recent
reform propositions, which, albeit very different, share a common denominator; the idea of
a local fisheries co-management system. The resistance within the corporatist establishment
and the political rhetoric to back it up, has proven effective by its reference to the largely in-
tuitive governance principle that since fish is a national resource and property it must be
managed at state level. We argue that such a principle and the vested interests and power
that support it, stand in the way of new ideas that – taken seriously – could inject an elem-
ent of genuine co-management into the governance of Norwegian fisheries. Therefore any
reform of the “old order” must begin by questioning the logic behind this principle.Corporatism in Norwegian fisheries
Historical roots
The literature on corporatism is extensive and this is not the place for an extensive review
or an elaborate discussion of the concept. Suffice it to say that corporatism, in this
particular context, denotes a political arrangement – a system of interest representation -
that incorporates the organized interests of civil society into the process of government
(cf. Schmitter 1979, 8-9). As such it reflects a symbiotic relationship between interest
groups and government, providing access and influence for the former, expertise and
legitimacy for the latter. To borrow a phrase from David Arter, the “essential logic of
corporatism is legitimization by incorporation” (Arter 2006, 125). More important in the
present context, however, is the assumption – or implication - that the groups incorpo-
rated often come to enjoy a privileged position that enables them to promote their
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Norway both the NFA and the Ministry of Fisheriesa benefit from this arrangement, which
probably explains why it prevails despite external pressures for change. The participation
(and influence) of key stakeholders secures legitimacy which in turn increases the govern-
ability of Norwegian fisheries.
We have in an earlier paper characterized Norwegian fisheries management as centralized
and corporatist, a system of centralized consultation based on institutionalized bargaining
between government and a key group of industry stakeholders (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2003).
For the sake of the argument we shall reiterate two of its basic characteristics. First, there is
the centralized, top-down structure of management decision-making – vesting the power to
make and implement policies and decisions in the hands of central government, notably the
Ministry of Fisheries and the Directorate of Fisheries. The latter is essentially a “profes-
sional” or staff agency whose main role is to provide advice and expertise to the Ministry
and secure the efficient implementation of – inter alia – management policies. It is one of
the oldest institutions within the fisheries bureaucracy – established as early as 1900 – and
it is generally considered to be more influential than its advisory role suggests (Mikalsen
and Jentoft 2003; Nordstrand 2000).
Second, there is the major role played by one particular and well organized group of
stakeholders: the NFA. Its long-standing status as the representative of the fishing
industry has given the association a privileged position within the Norwegian system of
fisheries governance. Very little that pertains to fisheries policy has been decided and
put into practice without formal consultations with the association, through the so-
called Regulatory Council (Hoel et al. 1996; (later replaced by the less formal and
more open Regulatory Meetings, of which more later) or by way of informal talks
between industry representatives and ministry officials (Jentoft and Mikalsen 2001).
This system is both “inspired” and sustained by the overall corporatist structure of
public policy-making that awards a key role to organized interest groups in public
policy making in virtually all sectors of the Norwegian economy, or for all of the
Nordic economies for that matter (Nordby 1994; Arter 2006). As such, corporatism
amounts to a “policy partnership” that combines centralized control, selective consultation
and interest group participation. Power is shared in order to secure legitimacy and compli-
ance. In other words, a system that provides for industry input and influence through
corporatist structures while retaining government control and ministerial responsibility.
The nature – and robustness - of the current system of centralized consultation
(‘corporatism’) probably owes much to its historical roots, and may well be perceived
as a product of particular political circumstances. What comes to mind here is first and
foremost the encouragement and support offered by government in establishing the NFA
during the latter part of the 1920s (Mikalsen et al. 2007), and its later decision to accept
the association as the only legitimate representative of the entire industry within the system
of government subsidies set up at the beginning of the 1960s (Hallenstvedt 1982; Jentoft
and Mikalsen 1987). Given that the state had actively sponsored, and to some extent initi-
ated, the formation of the association, its status as the representative of the industry was
awarded almost by default. The implication, we contend, was a privileged position for the
association that subsequently spilled over into other issues of fisheries governance. Of par-
ticular significance here is the government’s decision to implement limited entry across a
wide range of stocks and fisheries during the 1970s (Hersoug 2005), a policy that could not
Jentoft and Mikalsen Maritime Studies 2014, 13:5 Page 4 of 16
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/13/1/5have been effectively implemented without the support of the association which, by that
time, had come to include the economically powerful off-shore sector. The perception of
NFA as a representative voice of the harvesting sector in particular, and the subsequent
adoption of a corporatist approach to management policy-making strengthened and sus-
tained the position of the association as a privileged partner. With hindsight, these deci-
sions may well have come at “critical junctures” or major turning points that shaped the
basic institutional characteristics of Norwegian fisheries policy, i.e. at particular points in
time where government intervention was called for and its success depended on the con-
tributions of a representative (and reliable) policy-partner with broad support among key
stakeholders. Therefore, the “appointment” – and what amounted to a government licens-
ing - of the NFA as the voice of the entire industry, made sense politically and created a
“path” (and a vested interest) that have influenced the contents of fisheries policy as well as
the range of institutional alternatives found worthy of consideration. Over time the system
became “locked in” as existing arrangements have come to be taken as ‘given’ and seen as
more attractive and realistic than hypothetical alternatives with uncertain effects (and costs).
In any case, the association’s eager acceptance of its new role as industry representative
and the government’s “co-pilot” marked the beginning of a partnership that has since
developed into a highly institutionalized policy process where legitimacy and support are
traded for access, influence and efficient implementation. In other words, the privileged
position of the NFA – its ability to impact institutional design as well as the content of
management policy – is a product of the historical circumstances and government initia-
tives that virtually created the association, and as such a legacy that has proved both
powerful, effective and persistent. The legitimacy of government intervention was thus
established (and has been sustained) by the ability of government to “lean on” a key stake-
holder group whose consent is vital to efficient implementation of management policy.
The role of key player reflects the association’s history as a large and representative voice,
not just of fishermen and fishing, but of the coastal population in general.
As a governance system it reflects political traditions and an approach to regulatory
decision-making that cuts across sectors and industries. Regulatory institutions, be they
in fisheries, agriculture or health care, are largely a product of history and context. This
is why we often talk about a Nordic or Scandinavian model of governance, the essence
of which is policy-making by (selective and centralized) consultation (Arter 2006). This
means that institutions in, say, fisheries management will not – in their modus operandi –
differ fundamentally from regulatory institutions in other sectors of the economy
(Mikalsen and Jentoft 2008). There are, to adopt a phrase from David Vogel (1986),
distinct national styles of regulation. Therefore, new institutions are largely shaped
along the lines of existing ones. In Norway these are predominantly corporatist. As
such, this corporatist arrangement was – and still is - part and parcel of a well-
trodden path of interest intermediation in Norwegian politics. The institutional (and
political) environment into which fisheries governance is nested thus allows for lim-
ited flexibility in institutional design, as we shall see belowb.A powerful legacy?
Arguably, there is an institutional legacy, but how powerful is it? There is a recent trend
in Norwegian politics towards the decline of corporatism (Nordby 2004). There are fewer
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chinery of consultation” - the sheer number of committees and commissions - has been
reduced while lobbyism, particularly towards parliament, has increased (Rommetvedt
2011). A similar trend is evident in the fisheries. The system of government subsidies,
administered through a highly institutionalized and collaborative arrangement between
the state and the NFA, has been discontinued (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1987). Management
decision-making – at least in its preparatory stages – has become more transparent and
less exclusive. Replacing the Regulatory Council with the so-called Regulatory Meetings
has extended the opportunities for inputs beyond key stakeholders in the fishing industryc
This reform, however, stops well short of altering the centralized and standardized charac-
ter of the system; it “merely” extends the right to be heard to a wider group of people and
organizations claiming stakeholder status. Change, then, is not inconceivable, but it takes
more than this reform to weaken the corporatist character of the system in any fundamen-
tal way, or undermine the status and power of the NFA within it. However, since the regu-
latory meetings are held only twice a year, the new arrangement may have increased the
scope and frequency of informal exchanges between the Ministry and the Association. One
should perhaps not expect that the NFA would accept the new situation if it goes against
their interests. If so, corporatism will prevail through more informal means of
communication.
Judging from the current state of affairs, there is little to suggest that the NFA has
substantially lost power relative to other stakeholder groups as a consequence of this
reform. It still has the Minister’s ear, as the government depends on its support and
consent for the efficient implementation of public policy. In fact, as environmental
concerns have become more prominent in the marine realm, these two parties may find
their relationship even more important for keeping control of the fisheries policy
agenda, currently being challenged by the no less powerful partnership between the
Ministry of the Environment and the environmental movement. However, this divide is
no longer clear-cut as the fishing industry has joined forces with leading environmen-
talists in opposing the exploration (and eventual extraction) of oil and gas in areas
important to fishing, notably the waters off the Lofoten islands. These waters have
hosted a rich cod fishery that has attracted fishermen from all over Norway for ages.
More pertinent in this context is the fact that this fishery has been co-managed
through an elect group (a committee) of fishermen authorized to establish and enforce
so-called operational rules (Jentoft and Kristoffersen 1989; Holm et al. 2000). This
system has been changed into one where the NFA elects the members of the commit-
tee, replacing a participatory system of genuine co-management with a corporatist
oned. Explaining the persistence of corporatist structures the old adage “if it ain’t broke,
don’t fix it”, probably catches one of the factors at work here. However, the system has
been criticized, particularly by the Association of Coastal Fishermen and stakeholders
in fisheries dependent communities who argue that the close relationship between the
Ministry and the NFA rules out a serious discussion of management alternatives. The
irony here is that the relative success (measured in terms of stock conservation) of the
current system may have stripped its opponents of the political ammunition needed to
launch such a discussion. Management success may, in turn, have strengthened the
power and status of the NFA and muted the criticism from the environmental move-
ment. It should thus come as no surprise that Norway, according to government
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powerful incentive to defend current arrangements and thus increased the costs of
adopting alternative governance principles that would represent an exit from current
policy paths. In short, you don’t tamper with institutional legacies that work!
Dominant stakeholders – anticipating a challenge to their privileged position - will seek
to stifle public debates about possible alternatives, or at least attempt to define the basic
premise for such discussions. One such premise is the idea – or belief – that since fish is
a national asset and public property, it must be centrally managed. This belief is strong
and persistent, reiterated like a mantra whenever proposals for decentralization – how-
ever modest - are put forth. According to paragraph 2 of the 2008 Ocean Resources Actf,
“living marine resources belong to the Norwegian society as a whole.” Since few would
dispute this fundamental principle, the current system of centralized management may
seem to follow almost logically from that. Since fish stocks, at least in principle, belong to
the people of Norway, one could argue that their management is better left to institutions
that are expected to govern in the public (national) interest. In other words, centralization
follows from the assumption – held by dominant stakeholders such as government and
user-groups - that a national asset such as fish stocks is best managed by institutions
whose jurisdiction and authority transcends regional and local boundaries. In addition,
the history and relative success of current arrangements strengthens the propensity of
dominant stakeholders to take these for granted. The centralized and corporatist structure
is seen as “natural” and appropriate; as the only game possible in town, as it were.
Moreover, the lack of a real debate on alternatives should come as no surprise given the
virtual policy monopoly exercised through the policy partnership between central govern-
ment and the NFA. There are vested interests involved, and one should never underesti-
mate the political clout and powerful incentives of those that benefit from current
arrangements. Indeed, this may be a case where established institutions generate powerful
incentives that reinforce their stability and work against change (cf. Pierson 2000, 255).
Clearly, there are costs involved in introducing even limited reforms; administrative
costs incurred by establishing new procedures and institutions, political costs in the
possible loss of legitimacy among stakeholders benefitting from current arrangements.
There is thus an incentive for decision-makers to shield themselves from inputs on
alternative problem definitions and solutions in order to avoid the costs, uncertainties
and complexities pertaining to institutional reforms. Jon Elster’s metaphor for this
phenomenon is Ulysses who tied himself to the mast in order to resist being tempted
by the sirens (Elster 1979). Perhaps this is why proponents of change, such as those
behind the ‘experiments’ described in section 3 below, experience that they often speak
to deaf ears when they plead for management reform. Fisheries management decision-
makers may - metaphorically speaking - have waxed their ears in order to escape the
noise and avoid the possible costs and problems of reform.
Furthermore, the repertoire of formal legislation underpinning management policies
and ministerial authority is both complex and vague, granting considerable discretionary
powers to management agencies and officials. It is thus a common perception among key
stakeholders – government officials, MPs and the NFA’s leadership, in particular - that
since the exercise of discretion requires legal expertise (as well as scientific knowledge),
the authority to manage should be vested in central government agencies where such ex-
pertise is “on tap”, as it were. Is it also a dominant perception that since, in a democracy,
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administrative discretion needs to be checked, and that - in fisheries governance - this is
best achieved through standard procedures of political oversight and control where parlia-
ment and ministers are key actors. This view is echoed by the NFA, in a statement to the
effect that since fisheries management in particular, is a question of applying standardized
rules (formal legislation and administrative regulations), it is both indefensible and inex-
pedient to delegate management tasks to lower levels of governmentg.
Also, fisheries governance is very much about the allocation of scarce goods (e.g.
licenses and quotas) among individuals claiming – often rightly so - the same rights
and needs. In such a situation, scarcity implies “cruel” choices whose legitimacy may be
strengthened if traditional civil service norms of impartiality, adherence to formal rules
and consistent decision-making are observed, or at least perceived to be observed. If
so, the propensity to centralize, and the unwillingness to delegate, may stem from
perceptions – among politicians, managers and industry stakeholders – that the
chances of such norms being observed are strengthened when the power to manage is
located at the very top of the fisheries bureaucracy. Conversely, regional and local insti-
tutions are perceived to be lacking the political authority, professional qualifications
and administrative capacity to intervene effectively in areas of conflict and dispute.The legacy challenged?
As pointed out above, the criticism of the exclusive and overly corporatist character of
the system has been consequential. The perception of who has a legitimate stake in the
resources has been extended well beyond the industry, mainly through the inclusion of
new groups such as processors, environmental organizations, consumer representatives
and ethnic groups, all of which have a voice in the so-called Regulatory Meetingsh.
Their influence, however, is yet to be assessed. It may well be that this is a way of co-
opting the critics and adjusting procedures without seriously undermining the privileged
position of the NFA. A more recent and controversial challenge pertains more directly to
the centralized nature of the current system, and the unwillingness of government (and
key stakeholder groups) to seriously consider even a limited decentralization of manage-
ment responsibilities. These challenges emanate both from a global trend towards partial
devolution of management authority to local or regional institutions and from the new
tasks, techniques and ambitions facing fisheries managers. What we have in mind here in
particular are ecosystem-based approaches, spatial management such as marine protected
areas, coastal-zone planning, the management of local stocks, indigenous fishing rights/
privileges, and tenure rights also legitimized as human rights (Allison et al. 2012). Meeting
them would necessarily entail a role for local stakeholders, indigenous groups included, as
well as municipal and/or regional institutions. One may well ask whether the long-lasting
equilibrium of management policy is being punctuated by fresh initiatives and lessons
drawn from other sectors. The ideas, as we shall see, are there, alternatives and models
likewise, but what about agency - the institutions, people and power needed to put new
ideas and models on the agenda and eventually into practice?
Initiatives to that effect from below have so far been dismissed, sometimes ridiculed,
and even moderate adjustments to the current system of centralized consultation are
fiercely resisted. What are the forces at work here and the arguments used to justify
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tion – path dependency and administrative and legal factors among them. In an attempt
to address this question more thoroughly – assessing the politics, power and privileges
involved - we shall therefore present and discuss three, hopefully telling, cases where the
centralized character of the system has been challenged and its defendants have been
forced to argue their case.Regionalism – a recurring issue
In Norwegian fisheries, the centralization of governance goes back more than a century.
It was not before co-management was instituted for the Lofoten fishery in 1897, that
the problem with micro-management by the ministry was identified as a major obstacle
to efficient decision-making (Jentoft and Kristoffersen 1989). The sheer physical
distance between Oslo and Lofoten as well as the size and complexity of this particular
fishery, made it impossible for central government to adopt a hands-on approach to
management. In the Lofoten case, decentralization and devolvement of fisheries
management tasks to local institutions was therefore seen as a matter of necessity.
Fearing the fragmentation of the nation’s fisheries governance system, government
stopped short of introducing this reform in other fisheries. With few exceptions (see Jentoft
and Mikalsen 1994), the Lofoten model has remained a special case in Norwegian fisheries
governance. Over time, and especially with the extension of national jurisdiction to 200
miles in the mid-1970s, central government became an increasingly powerful player in
Norwegian fisheries governance (Holm 2001). Today, the notion that since fisheries
resources are a national property, they should be managed by the Ministry is a normative
principle underpinning an institutional arrangement that is largely taken for granted. Those
who defend the principle are seldom called upon to justify their support. Instead, it is those
who promote the decentralization and regionalization of the Norwegian fisheries govern-
ance system, who seem to have the burden of proof.
However, the possible shortcomings of hierarchical governance and unilateral state
control, recognized - inter alia - in recent debates within the European Union, have also
been voiced in Norwegian fisheries. Is state-level micro-management really appropriate in
all fisheries? Should some management tasks be delegated to institutions at the municipal
or county level? As already noted, counties and municipalities are largely by-standers in
Norwegian fisheries governance as the current system does not allow them to play a
meaningful role, except in issues pertaining to coastal zone planningi. The regionalization/
decentralization issue has also been raised in connection with the “spatial turn” (St. Martin
and Hall-Arber 2008) in marine governance, noticeable in the Norwegian discourse on the
establishment of marine protected areas. Here, Norway is lagging behind other nations for
reasons that will be discussed below. Last but not least, Norway’s indigenous people, the
Sami of the coastal regions of the north, have been pressing for a formal recognition of
their marine tenure rights and for more autonomy – or “self-governance” - in fisheries
management. This would, of course, lead to devolvement of management functions from
central government to Sami institutions located almost as far away as you can get from the
capital and its government offices. No wonder, then, given the aforementioned ‘second
principle’, that there is considerable resistance to such a reform. Machiavelli clearly hit the
nail when he stated that there is nothing more difficult than to initiate a new order of
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ment. We shall examine three of these in order to substantiate our point.The Lyngenfjord project
This was a project launched in 1993 by three adjacent municipalities, the aim of which
was the establishment of a local fisheries management system for the Lyngen fjord in
North Norway. The project, how it came about and its eventual demise have been
described in detail by Holm et al. (1998), and we will draw heavily on their account.
The impetus behind the project was the identification of a distinct cod stock for that
particular fjord which - according to official of these municipalities – could best be
managed locally, by institutions in which the municipalities should themselves be
involved. This, of course, ran counter to the dominant perception of the cod as a single
stock and fisheries management as a matter for the ministry and its network of national
institutions. The state of Norwegian fisheries at that time - a general crisis leading to
strict quota regulations (Jentoft 1993) – called for new ideas and institutions. Thus, the
project was launched as a five year experiment in local marine management, based on
evidence - produced by the Marine Science Institute in Tromsø - that a local stock
indeed existed. Conferences were held where the idea was floated and a detailed pro-
posal for a management system for the fjord was developed. The formal organizational
structure involved a reference group of people with local knowledge and scientific
advisory board. The idea was to manage the fishery on the basis of annual quotas for
each commercial species in the fjord. In 1995 the project was submitted to the Ministry
of Fisheries for approval.
By then the crisis in the cod fisheries was over and the impetus for management
reform was gone. The government was confident that the current system had proved
its worth during the crisis; it was not broken and thus in no need of repair. So, when
the project proposal was submitted to the Ministry, it met with little enthusiasm, to say
the least. As Holm et al. (1998:86-87) put it: “Instead of treating the Lyngen Project in
good faith, trying to establish a common understanding of the problems identified and
how it could be solved, as its promoters had expected, the Ministry subjected it to a
definitively hostile trial of strength.” Ministry officials were bent on taking down the
plan. Not only did they go against the proposal as such, they also rejected outright the
notion of local stocks. The Lyngen delegation left the meeting utterly disappointed and
disillusioned.
Holm and his co-authors explain what they call the “assassination of the Lyngen Fjord
Project” as motivated by the Ministry’s commitment “to the idea of fishing as a national
resource, galvanised against local or regional property claims” and the perception of the
project as an attack on the fundamentals of the established fisheries management system.
Transferring the powers to manage to a local institution was clearly out of the question,
even if the power to appoint its members would be retained. The prospects of the project
creating a precedent - triggering similar claims from other coastal municipalities - were
highly unsettling to both the Ministry and the Director General of Fisheries (Holm et al.
1998: 87). In the end the air went out of the Lyngen balloon and the project was shelved,
never to appear again, neither in Lyngen nor anywhere else. That does not mean, however,
that the issue of decentralization went away, as we shall see below.
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In 1990 Norway ratified the ILO Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous peoples. That
year a new system of vessel quotas was introduced that in effect closed the Norwegian
fishery (Hersoug 2005). The two events would immediately intersect. This happened when
the newly elected Sami Parliament raised the issue with the government that the quota sys-
tem seemed to discriminate against Sami fishers. Given the timing, this was a criticism the
Ministry of Fisheries could not ignore. It immediately appointed a prominent law professor
(Carsten Smith) to assess the claim. His report was filed the same year, and since then the
Sami fisheries rights claims have been a salient issue in Norwegian fisheries politics. Smith
argued that the ratification of ILO 169, together with additional domestic and international
legislation pertaining to the rights of minorities, meant that Norway was obliged to install
mechanisms that would secure the rights of the Sami people, including the material basis
for their culture. As the fishery was always a major source of livelihood in several Sami
communities, this translated into an obligation of government to secure their rights to fish,
acknowledging their tenure and self-determination.
To the dismay of the Sami, the implementation of this obligation has been cumbersome
and contentious, and much more so in the marine than the terrestrial realm. In the latter
realm, legislation (The Finnmark Act) was adopted by the Norwegian Parliament in 2005,
granting the Sami a specific legal status regarding land use. The fishery issue, however,
dragged out until new legislation was proposed in 2008 that recognized the historical
rights of fishing for people living in the county of Finnmark. The basic elements including
a quota sufficient to generate a decent income, a co-management system established to
administer harvesting within a territory defined by the county borders and the ocean base
line. As for the Lyngen Fjord Project, one would think that such a minor reform would
not cause much opposition as it was in accordance with what the government has signed
up for when the ILO 169 was ratified. (A more elaborate account of what happened is
given by Jentoft (2013).
This time, however, the Sami were up against a much stronger force as the entire
Norwegian fisheries establishment, including the Ministry of Fisheries and the MFA
was strongly against almost all of what the legislative proposal suggested. The latter
was opposed to any reform that would decentralize management functions to lower
levels of authority, undermining the corporate model of management – and thus its
privileged position, in Norwegian fisheries. The following quote sums up the gist of the
argument – and neatly illustrates the point we are trying to make:
“The Fishers’Association considers the proposal to establish a separate fisheries zone
outside Finnmark, which also includes a separate management organization, as an
attempt to introduce a regional management system in Finnmark… This is a
fundamental departure from the principles that have been basic in recent times,
which is governance by the state… Because of the serious consequences of a regional
management and regulation of fisheries resources, the Fishers’Association rejects the
entire proposal.” (Prop. 70 L (2011-12), p. 66) (Our translation)
Interestingly, the Ministry emphasized the need to distinguish between the legal and
political aspects of the case. The law commission’s report, said the Ministry, did not
distinguish clearly between the responsibilities emanating from international law on the
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Norway, on the other. Whether this meant that when the legal principles go against
current policy, the former yields, is not entirely clear. As Smith (2013) himself observed;
“Law is law even if the law points in the same direction as good national policy.” He finds
the government’s position on the matter puzzling. In our view, this can be explained by
the Ministry’s opposition to a decentralization of fisheries management, a view it has held
consistently in the past and continues to hold, as we shall see below.
In June 2012, the Norwegian Parliament turned down the legislative proposal, striking
instead an agreement with the Sami Parliament that does not include a co-management
model but one that grants the Sami an advisory status in fisheries management and with
the Ministry at the helm.The Tvedestrand MPA
Compared to other states around the North Sea, Norway has been rather slow in creating
marine protected areas. Although plans have been developed by the Fisheries Directorate
for the Norwegian coast as a whole, their implementation has been cumbersome - for
reasons illustrated in the Tvedestrand case, which is a pioneer project in the Norwegian
context. Whereas the previous two cases refer to events and issues occurring in the high
north of Norway, this one is taking place close to the southernmost tip of the country.
Tvedestrand is a small coastal municipality in the county of Aust-Agder, facing the North
Sea. Here, the pressure from recreational activities is much more prevalent than in the other
two instances reported above. Still, there is a local commercial and recreational small-scale
fishery in the area. There is thus a need for resource management, nature conservation and
conflict resolution among different stakeholders competing for space and resources. Here
the conflict emanates from an initiative by municipal authorities to establish a marine
protected area (MPA), in collaboration with the Institute of Marine Research, which has a
station in a neighboring municipally. The institute has since long been taking stock of the
marine ecosystem in the area through a project called “Aktiv forvaltning” (Active manage-
ment). Authorities at the regional level have supported the initiative, while the NFA and its
regional branch have made strong efforts to stop it.
The proposal to protect the local marine areas originated through the Active manage-
ment project and was presented to the municipal assembly in March 2011. It listed four
different zoning categories, one for “multiple use”, another one for fish farming, plus a
“habitat zone” and a “protection zone”. The latter involved a no fishing rule. In total 15
percent of the ocean area of the municipality would be included. The municipality initi-
ated a hearing process and several stakeholder meetings were held, which resulted in
some minor revisions of the plan without changing the main thrust of it. However, the
plan was strongly criticized in the local media and attacked by the regional and local
branch of the NFA. This did not, however, stop the municipal assembly from supporting
the conservation plan and the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs from accepting
the zoning proposal in June 2012. This came as a surprise and major disappointment to
the Southern Branch of the NFA. In a telefaxed letter to the Minister, they characterized
this as “a major blow” to the traditional coastal fishery in the area and the process as “a
scandal from the very beginning of the project.” They also advised against the involvement
of the NFA in similar processes in other parts of the country (letter of Sept 15, 2012).
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2012), the main argument against the plan – echoing the position of the association’s cen-
tral office and that of the Ministry - is that since fish is a national resource, the fisheries
should be managed at the national level, “not regionally or locally”. And:
“We are thus pleased to learn that the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs in a
joint meeting at Flødevigen on June 5 this year unequivocally upheld that resource
management is, and shall be, a national task under the Fisheries and Coastal
Ministry”.
The point here is not the details of the zoning arrangement or the local criticism during
the hearing process and in the local media. Our focus is on the arguments provided by
the NFA for going against the plan, and how these echo the overall political principles of
fisheries governance advanced by this organization and the government. In several letters
to the Ministry of the Environment and to the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs,
the NFA strongly supported their regional and local branch in their defense of the
“national resource, central management” principle. The association criticized the lack of
appreciation for the viewpoints advanced by commercial fishers and their representatives,
including its own protests, claiming that the projects lacked legitimacy within the indus-
try. In a letter of April 27, 2012, the NFA asked for a meeting with the Ministry to discuss
the matter. A more lengthy argument was developed in a letter to the Fisheries Director-
ate dated March 30, where they disputed the Directorate’s perception that “the current
system with national regulations” is not capable of handling local biological variation and
therefore not sustainable. The Directorate’s view – that regionalization of the governance
system should be considered – was rejected outright. The position of the association –
and the principle from which it emanates – is neatly illustrated in the following
statement:
“The governance model for Norwegian fisheries must stay firm. We shall have a
central fisheries governance system in Norway. Changes in relation to the fishers’
most important interest areas must be decided based on processes at the national
level and not at the municipal or local level.” (page 5).Discussion and conclusion
Alluding to Aristotle’s concept of “first principle”, an axiom from which other princi-
ples can be logically deduced, we have examined the “meta-governance” of Norwegian
fisheries, or what Kooiman (2003) refers to as “governing the governance”, i.e. the basic
assumptions, values and principles underpinning the design and operation of govern-
ance systems. In Norway the ‘first principle” states that living marine resources (i.e. wild
fish), belong to all Norwegians as a collective or national property. This principle is also
included in the Ocean Resources Act, passed unanimously by the Norwegian Parliament
in 2008j. What we have labeled the “second principle” - that fisheries management is a
task for central government, is clearly more controversial, and not specified in any act of
Parliament pertaining to the fishery. In fact, the Ocean Resources Act opens up for
decentralization and delegation of management functions as it allows for delegation to
fishermen’s cooperative sales organizations (paragraph 48) and for certain fisheries within
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Building Act (2009), which regulates coastal zone planning, allows for municipal authorities
to play a role. However, their mandate is limited by the lex specialis principle that gives
fisheries legislation right of way when there is conflict and overlapping jurisdictions. Thus,
centralized management is not the only game in town - as one is led to believe following
the political debate about regionalism in Norwegian fisheries as current legislation allows
for a more diversified and multi-layered system involving both different levels of govern-
ment and fishermen’s ‘cooperatives’. Whereas the first principle of Norwegian fisheries
governance enjoys legal backing, the second one does not. The latter, we argue, must there-
fore be seen in the context of the ongoing political struggle for power and influence in
Norwegian fisheries governance. Although strong on legacy and enthusiastically supported
by the NFA, the second principle is being increasingly challenged, particularly from outside
the industry. The three cases presented above, are all of recent origin, and not yet settled.
Despite their differences, they are all based on the idea of a more regionalized governance
system that vests power and control with local authorities, involving a broader set of stake-
holders. In contrast to the hegemonic corporatist model, they entail an element of genuine
co-management, i.e. of shared responsibility among actors below the level of the state. They
thus represent a challenge to the “established order” of Norwegian fisheries governance.
And these cases are far from trivial; modeling management on them may impact the entire
governance system, as pointed out by the NFA commenting on the Tvedestrand case. This
scenario of fundamental change largely explains its opposition to these new proposals as
they are ‘nibbling’ at the core of the corporatist model, already threatened by the move to-
wards ecosystem-based management and the “spatial turn” in fisheries governance globally
(St. Martin and Hall-Arber 2008). That said, the corporatist model in Norwegian fisheries
still enjoys considerable support as it has proved quite successful in attaining the twin goals
of management efficiency and political legitimacy. Those who want to “initiate a new order
of things” thus face an uphill struggle because the burden of proof rests on them. There-
fore, there is reason to assume that the fate of Saami tenure rights, and area-based co-
management schemes such as marine protected areas will only be adopted if and when
they fit in with the corporatist model.
Principles – whether of fisheries management or other forms of governance - may
well sound self-evident and logical, but they are not therefore exempt from closer in-
spection. They should be seen as part of governance itself, not something that is out-
side and prior to it (Kooiman and Jentoft 2009). Any principle, however, is only as good
as the argument underpinning it. We are not in this paper questioning the validity of
the ‘first’ principle in Norwegian fisheries governance but rather its corollary (‘the sec-
ond principle’) and the arguments advanced in its support. Does the ‘second’ principle
necessarily follow from the ‘first’? While the second principle draws an axiomatic aura
from the first, the deduction is rarely scrutinized. The argument is mostly a practical –
or administrative - one, as when the NFA questions the management qualifications of
regional and Sami authoritiesk. This argument, of course, is not without merit, but it
points to a problem that - given sufficient determination - can be solved by building
management capacity at lower levels of government. The question then, is whether the
reference to administrative feasibility is really a self-serving argument in disguise. The
mantra about fish resources being a national property and its stated implications (that
they must be managed at state level) serves the purpose of maintaining status quo.
Jentoft and Mikalsen Maritime Studies 2014, 13:5 Page 14 of 16
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/13/1/5It helps to preserve privileges and existing power relations in Norwegian fisheries govern-
ance, protecting the vested interests of the NFA. A departure from the corporatist model
would create institutional confusion and pose a threat to current arrangements, signaling
the end to the cozy and long-lasting relationship between the Ministry and the NFA. Not-
ably, the corporatist model has also served the Ministry well as it needs the backing of the
industry to secure legitimacy for its policies and – as illustrated by frequent debates on gov-
ernment reorganization – perhaps also for its very existence. The structure of government
departments is not written in stone, but often subject to reform, especially when a new gov-
ernment is installed. Throughout its history the Ministry of Fisheries has indeed been facing
proposals for mergers with other departments, most recently with the Ministry of Trade
and Industry. There is thus no guarantee that the Fisheries Ministry will survive in the wake
of the next election. Should it not, the Ministry of the Environment may well be in line to
take over its fisheries management functions. If so, policy agendas will probably change,
undermining current privileges and existing power relations in Norwegian fisheriesl.
The Ministry of the Environment is already involved in the Tvedestrand case depicted
above, and there is no guarantee the NFA will meet an open door here. No wonder then,
that the three cases presented make the association apprehensive about its power and priv-
ileges. It is perhaps not the prospect of decentralization and delegation that is the most
troublesome to the association. There is after all, a certain tradition for that in Norwegian
fisheries, even if examples are few and far between. But delegation has always been limited
to institutions or organizations within the fisheries sector and has not challenged the power
of the NFA directly. With new – and arguably more serious - challenges raised by the en-
vironmental, indigenous and regional agendas, the situation is different. Decentralization
and delegation would make the governance system more open to external influence which
may well undermine the second principle and the corporatist model it serves to legitimate.
No doubt, such reforms would face strong opposition from the fisheries political establish-
ment that is currently firmly committed to the corporatist model.
Endnotes
aThe Ministry of Fisheries changed its name to “Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs”
in 2004.
bThe fact that this is also the case in Denmark indicates that there may be a Scandinavian
model at work here. Cf. Raakjær Nielsen and Christensen 2006; Mikalsen and Jentoft 2008.
cAccording to the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs these are “…open
meetings where fisheries organizations, processors, trade unions, the Sami Parliament,
local authorities, environmental groups and other stakeholders participate.
dIn this case adjustments were needed due to changes in the overall structure of fisheries
management caused by the introduction of a vessel quota system at the beginning of the
1990s.
eIn fact, this claim is not entirely without merit. In a comparison between 53 countries
with regard to compliance with the “Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and of
ecosystem-based management, Norway ranks top – although the overall global picture is
rather bleak. (Cf. Pitcher et al. 2009a, 2009b.) This evaluation correlates strongly with the
World Bank’s good governance index and the UN Human Development index.
fLOV 2008-06-06 nr. 37: Lov om forvaltning av viltlevande marine ressursar
(Havressurslova).
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May 5, 2008.
hThese meetings also reflect the fact that NFA is no longer considered the only ‘user-
group’ or legitimate voice. In addition to the association of inshore fishermen mentioned
earlier, Sami fishermen have formed their own association. Both are currently involved at the
consultative stages of management policy-making, mainly through the so-called Regulatory
Meetings.
iAccording to the Planning and Building Act, municipal authorities are responsible
for creating a plan for the allocation of space among competing interests, for instance
fishing and salmon aquaculture as the latter has been booming since the mid-1970s
and unavoidably intersect with other marine activities. See Holm and Jentoft 1995.
jThe validity of the first principle has also been contested – inter alia with reference to
policies that entail a privatization of a public resource, i.e. the allocation of fishing quotas
that can be marketed and traded at the discretion of the current holder (cf. Hersoug
2005). However, the Supreme Court has recently (October 2013) ruled that fishing quotas
can only be granted for a limited period of time. They are thus not to be considered and
treated as private property in the legal sense of the term.
kSimilar arguments have been raised vis-à-vis the Ministry of the Environment and
the Ministry of Municipal and Regional Affairs.
lIn fact, the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs will probably not survive in its
present form. The new government that came to power after the 2013 parliamentary
election has announced that the ministry will be merged into a new Ministry of Industry
and Fisheries as of January 1, 2014. This ministry will be led by two cabinet ministers.
Cf. announcement by the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs on its homepage.
mThis paper was originally presented at the MARE Conference “People and the Sea”,
Amsterdam June 26 – 28, 2013.
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